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COMMENTS
RATIONALIZING THE FEDERAL ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
AND EVOLVING JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past century, plaintiffs in federal courts have repeatedly challenged
the ability of a foreign government to confiscate property located within the
foreign jurisdiction without rendering just compensation. Faced with this
delicate issue, courts have weighed the principles of traditional AngloAmerican property law against deference to the foreign sovereign and the
need to preserve good diplomatic relations with expropriating states. The
somewhat unsatisfactory result became known as the American act of state
doctrine and received its classic formulation by the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez:'
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves. 2
Although the Court has since reaffirmed this principle, four exceptions to the
traditional doctrine have been urged by litigants with varying degrees of
success. One of these, the so-called Bernstein exception, holds that the
judiciary should not accord conclusive validity to the act of a foreign state
when the executive branch determines that an adjudication on the merits will
not interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the political branches of
the government. 3 According to the international law exception, the act of a
foreign state may be subjected to a judicial review based upon the principles
of international law. 4 A third exception to the act of state doctrine requires
that the counterclaim of a defendant not be barred where an expropriating
foreign government is itself a plaintiff in an American court.5 Finally, the
commercial act exception provides that judicial deference is denied a foreign
state insofar as that state behaves as a commercial, rather than a sovereign,
entity. 6 Over the past three decades these exceptions have been variously
accepted and rejected by the Supreme Court in a perplexing welter of
opinions, dissents, and concurrences. 7 Thus, the present outlines of the act of
state doctrine in the United States are unclear to legal scholars and practitioners alike. Of more importance perhaps, the direction which the development
1.
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6.
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of the doctrine should take remains uncertain. This Comment will examine
the evolution of the federal act of state doctrine, analyze the proposed
exceptions to the sweep of its classic statement, and suggest an interpretation
of the doctrine which would best serve the ends of justice within the legal and
practical circumstances which give it shape.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL COURTS

While intimations of the doctrine are present in earlier decisions of British
and American courts, 8 Underhill v. Hernandez9 marks the starting point of
any discussion of the doctrine as formulated by the Supreme Court.' 0 The
plaintiff, an American citizen operating a water system in Venezuela, sought
to leave the country during a revolution. The defendant, a general in the
revolutionary army, refused his request for an exit pass and allegedly had him
assaulted in an effort to coerce him to remain in Venezuela and continue to
operate the water system.'' The Court refused to interfere, noting that the
United States had subsequently recognized the revolutionaries as the legitimate government of Venezuela and that this recognition retroactively endowed all prior acts of the government with a presumed validity not open to
question in American courts.1 2 In three more cases prior to 1920, the Supreme
Court relied upon Underhill for the principle that the acts of foreign
sovereigns are beyond question in American courts.13 All of these early cases
were decided by the Supreme Court without dissent.
8. Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, in International Law in the Twentieth Century 411,
412-14 (L. Gross ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Zander].
9. 168 U.S. 250 (1897); see note 1 supra and accompanying text.
10. Underhill is the first case which the Supreme Court clearly decided on act of state
grounds, and provides the foundation for the Court's analysis in subsequent cases.
11. There is no indication in the opinion of how the American court secured jurisdiction of
the case.
12. 168 U.S. at 253-54. The Supreme Court developed this reasoning further in Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918).
13. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), the defendant
persuaded a Central American government to cause the financial ruin of plaintiffs banana
plantation. The Court held that the laws of the United States did not reach the acts of the
defendant in foreign states. Id. at 355-57. The Court also observed that the act of a foreign state
could not be made the basis of liability in an American court: "The fundamental reason is that It
isa contradiction in terms to say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign
power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desirable and proper. It does
not, and foreign courts cannot, admit that the influences were improper or the results bad. It
makes the persuasion lawful by its own act. The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of
the sovereign makes law." Id. at 358.
The Mexican Revolution brought two more act of state cases before the Supreme Court. The
Court held that the principles of comity between sovereigns expounded in Underhill precluded
review of the transfer of title to property requisitioned by a general of the Mexican revolutionary army. The subsequent recognition of the revolutionary government by the United States
barred relief for the former owner, regardless of his citizenship. Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,
246 U.S. 304 (1918) (former owner was an American citizen); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297 (1918) (former owner was a Mexican citizen)
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The first exception to the act of state doctrine was not asserted in the
federal courts until after World War II. After the property of a German Jew
was confiscated by Nazi decree and subsequently sold, the former owner
brought suit against the purchasers. Upon appeal from a dismissal of the
complaint, Judge Learned Hand felt constrained in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Fr~res Socigtg Anonyre 14 to apply the act of state doctrine and recognize the
validity of the Nazi government's dispossession and transfer of title, despite
the elements of coercion and anti-Semitism present in the case.' s However,
the opinion hinted at a different result if the executive branch were to advise
the court that it should not apply the doctrine.' 6 Seven years later, in7
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-AmerikaanscheStoomvaart.-Maatschappij,
the State Department did in fact issue a press release in which the United
States government advised that the American courts should not apply the act
of state doctrine to render the acts of the National Socialist government valid.
The court of appeals for the Second Circuit followed the executive suggestion
and permitted plaintiff to prove his case against the Nazi action. '8 Hence, the
Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine was formulated, and it became
the rule, at least in the Second Circuit, that courts need not apply the
doctrine if the executive so indicated in what came to be called a Bernstein
letter.
Three more exceptions to the act of state doctrine were urged in three
subsequent cases dealing with confiscatory acts of the Castro government in
Cuba after January 1, 1959. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,19 title
to a shipload of sugar had purportedly been nationalized. 20 The district court
recognized that the act of state doctrine would ordinarily prevent it from
questioning the validity of the Cuban action. 2 ' However, the court found that
the nationalization violated international law in that it was retaliatory and not
for a proper public purpose. 22 Further, it discriminated by reaching only
American property, and provided for illusory compensation. 23 Hence, the
American
court refused to adhere to the act of state doctrine, reasoning that
24
courts were obligated to respect and enforce international law.
The court of appeals modified the decision slightly by declining to hold that
14.

163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).

15. Id. at 248-50.
16. Judge Hand assumed that it was within the power of the executive branch to direct the
courts in their application of the act of state doctrine, and asked whether the "Executive, which is
the authority to which we must look for the final word in such matters, has declared that the
commonly accepted doctrine . . . does not apply." Id. at 249.
17. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
18. Id. at 376.
19. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
20. The facts of the case are fully set out in the court of appeals opinion. See Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 849-52 (2d Cir. 1962).
21. Banco Naciona de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), modified,
307 F.2d 845, 849-52 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
22. Id. at 384-85.
23. Id. at 385-86.
24. Id. at 380-82.
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any one of the grounds advanced below would by itself be sufficient to
constitute a violation of international law.2 5 However, the court found that all
three were present in the instant case and together proved a violation of
international law. 26 The Supreme Court reversed.

27

The majority discussed

the reasons for the act of state doctrine, and examined the proposed international law exception. 28 It found that the doctrine was justified by the primacy
of the political branches in the conduct of foreign affairs. 29 Accordingly, the
judiciary was barred from interfering in this area even where a violation of
customary international law was alleged. 3 0 In a solitary dissent, Justice White
disputed the weight given by the majority to the issue of executive primacy in
foreign affairs and argued vigorously that litigants had a right to a determi-

that United States courts
nation on the merits. 3 ' In addition, he reasoned
32

were obliged to enforce international law.
The second Cuban case was First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba,33 which after a complex litigation history, generated the counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine. Citibank had been holding a
collateralized loan outstanding to Cuba when all of its Cuban branches were
nationalized on September 10, 1960. The bank retaliated for the loss by
selling the collateral it held, realizing about $2,000,000 more than the amount
of its loan. When Cuba brought suit to recover the excess collateral, Citibank
sought to set off the value of its nationalized branches against the recovery
sought by Cuba. The district court permitted the setoff, holding that Congress
had terminated the operation of the act of state doctrine by the second
Hickenlooper amendment. 34 This amendment gave property owners the
protection of international law by directing the courts to ignore the act of state
doctrine and decide the merits in certain cases. 35 The court of appeals for the
25.
26.

307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
Id. at 868.

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Id.
29. Id. at 431-34.
30. Id. at 421-39. Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan implied that there might be an
exception to the doctrine for conventional international law: "[W]e decide only that the Judicial
Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of
a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the
complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law." Id. at 428.
Customary international law is the past and present practice of nations which becomes
accepted as general law. It may be contrasted with conventional international law which is
embodied in international treaties and agreements. See I.C.J. Stat. art. 38, pam. 1.
31. 376 U.S. at 450-53, 461-72.
32. Id. at 450-61.
33. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). A full statement of the facts of the case may be found in the district
court opinion at 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1005-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
34. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
35. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). The second Hickenlooper amendment was passed by
Congress in response to the Supreme Court's decision in the Sabbatino case. First passed
27.

28.
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Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Hickenlooper amendment had been
intended by Congress to reach only those situations where expropriated
brought into the United States, a circumstance not present in
property 3was
6
the case.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the court of appeals for
reconsideration in light of a possible Bernstein letter from the State Department. 37 In its letter, the State Department indicated that it would find no
interference with the conduct of foreign affairs if the courts declined to apply
the act of state doctrine and permitted a setoff in circumstances like those in
the case at bar.38 Despite this letter, the Second Circuit persisted in its belief
that the act of state doctrine ruled the case and again reached the same result,
39
reasoning that the judiciary must make an independent determination.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the district court judgment allowing the setoff. 40 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a plurality of three justices, accepted the State Department's
Bernstein letter as controlling. 4' Justice Douglas concurred in the result, but
rejected the Bernstein exception as an improper intrusion by the executive
into judicial affairs. 42 He reasoned that considerations of fairness required
that a foreign state be subject to any counterclaim up to the amount it sought
as plaintiff, without regard to the act of state doctrine. 4 3 Justice Powell also
concurred in the result, but he rejected the rationales of both Justice Rehntemporarily, it was soon enacted permanently after minor changes. See the discussion, including a
finding of the law's consitutionality, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), affld, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968) The amendment
reads in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on
the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or
other rights to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming
through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1,
1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law . 22 U.S.C §
2370(e)(2) (1970).
36. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 395 (2d Cir. 1970).
37. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba. 400 U.S. 1019 (1971). In its remand.
the Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the case. Nor did it offer an opinion
on the weight to be given the State Department's letter. This issue loomed large in the subsequent
deliberations of both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court and added another dimension to
the entanglement of the act of state doctrine with the concept of separation of powers. See notes
39-44 infra and accompanying text.
38. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 536-38 app (2d Cir
1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
39. Id. at 532-36.
40. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U,S, 759 (1972)41. Id. at 767-70.
42. Id. at 772-73 (Douglas, J.,concurring).
43. Id. at 770-73 (Douglas, J.,concurring). Justice Douglas relied upon National City Bank
v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), a sovereign immunity case. There the Court held that
a foreign sovereign, by entering an American court as a plaintiff, waived its immunity from suit
as to all setoffs of the defendant, up to the amount of plaintiff's claim.
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quist and Justice Douglas. 44 He felt that the rejection of the international
law exception in Sabbatino was in error and that Cuba's violation of international law in seizing Citibank's branches would justify the award on
Citibank's counterclaim. 45 The four dissenting justices rejected the Bernstein
exception as an unwarranted interference by the executive 46
in judicial affairs
and indicated their support for the holding in Sabbatino.
It should be noted that although much of the discussion in the case focused
upon the Bernstein exception, that exception actually received the support of
only the three Justices in the plurality. 47 These three Justices also found that
the equitable nature of the counterclaim exception was "consonant with" the
Bernstein exception. 48 As a result, when lower federal courts attempted to
apply the holding in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
they were limited to its facts and result, namely, that a foreign state appearing
as a plaintiff may not offer the act of state doctrine as a bar to a defendant's
counterclaim for a sum not exceeding plaintiff's claim. 49 This is the apparent
holding of the case even though the plurality opinion discussed the counterclaim exception only briefly.50
The Court's most recent decision dealing with the act of state doctrine is
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. " That case involved a
dispute over payment for Cuban cigars which had been shipped to American
importers for several months before and after the "intervention" or nationalization s2 of the cigar manufacturing shops by the Cuban government. Both
the former Cuban owners of the cigar factories and the Cuban government
sought payment from the importers for all of the cigars shipped.5 3 The district
court held that the former owners were entitled to payment for those cigars
shipped prior to the nationalization and the Cuban government for those
44. 406 U.S. at 773-74 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 774-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 776-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). All of the opinions in the Supreme Court assumed
sub silentio in their discussion of the case that the Second Circuit's opinion was correct in that the
Hickenlooper Amendment did not lift the act of state bar on the facts of the case.
47. Id. at 760-70.
48. Id. at 768-69.
49. For an explanation of the meaning of First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
see Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1373 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
50. 406 U.S. at 768-69.
51.

425 U.S. 682 (1976).

52. The differences between intervention and nationalization seem slight to an American
observer and are non-existent in terms of the effect on the former owners of intervened concerns.
-See United States Supreme Court Case Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba:
Summary and Excerpts from the Briefs Filed in the Supreme Court, in 15 International Legal
Materials 146, 168 n,2 (1976).
53. A complete statement of the facts in this case is in Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg,
Inc., $45 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified sub norm. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d
1355, 1373 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682 (1976), and the related case of F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp.
481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
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shipped after the nationalization . 4 The situation was further complicated by
the fact that the Cuban government refused to return funds mistakenly paid
to them by the importers for pre-intervention cigars.55 The importers sought
to set off that amount against their debt to Cuba for the post-intervention
shipments. The district court permitted the setoff, and granted an affirmative
judgment to Dunhill, an
importer whose prior payments exceeded the amount
56
held owing to Cuba.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the former owners
were entitled to payment for the pre-intervention shipments.57 The court,
however, found that the Cuban government's refusal to repay the money
received was an act of state and therefore not open to examination by
American courts.5 8 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that, under the
Supreme Court's decision in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba,5 9 the importers were entitled to a setoff limited by the amount of
Cuba's judgment against them. Thus, the district court's decision 6was
mod0
ified in that Dunhill lost its affirmative judgment against Cuba.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the in-court
statements of Cuba's counsel that Cuba would not return the mistakenly
made payments were an act of state. 6' The Court also ordered argument on
whether the counterclaim exception created in First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba62 and limited there to the amount of the plaintiff's
claim could be extended to an affirmative judgment against a foreign
sovereign. 63 It was observed that Dunhill's affirmative judgment did not
exceed the balance owed to Cuba by the codefendants and that all claims and
54. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, 345 F. Supp. 527, 534-42, (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified
sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1373 (2d Cir. 1973), reV'd sub nom. Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The district court held that
the act of state doctrine required accepting the validity of the transfer of title by the intervention
decree. There was no question of international law involved since the cigar manufacturers were
Cuban citizens. Id. at 537. But the court refused to recognize the intervention insofar as it
applied to money owed for the pre-intervention shipments. Because these debts were found to be
located with the debtor importers in the United States, they were subject to American law and
therefore protected from the effects of any purported extraterritorial expropriation. Id. at 537-38;
see United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of Iraq v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
55. At one time Cuba had agreed to make restitution if granted recovery for the post-intervention shipments. When the true magnitude of the amounts became known, Cuba repudiated this
agreement. 345 F. Supp. at 533-34.
56. Id. at 563-64.
57. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rct,'d sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
58. Id. at 1370-71.
59. 406 U.S. 759 (1972); see notes 33-44 supra and accompanying text.
60. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
61. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974).
62. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
63. 416 U.S. 981 (1974).
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counterclaims had arisen from the same matter. 6 4 After the briefing and
argument of these two questions, a reargument was ordered, which included
the additional question of whether the rejection
of the international law
65
exception in Sabbatino should be reconsidered.
The Supreme Court finally decided Dunhill on a narrow ground. 66 Five
Justices adhered to an opinion by Justice White that the statements of counsel
for Cuba, refusing to return the payments mistakenly made, did not constitute
an act of state. 67 Justice White observed that these statements could be
construed as no more than a continued insistence on the mistaken position
that Cuba was entitled to the accounts receivable of the expropriated manufacturers by virtue of the intervention decree. 68 Justice White cited an
analogous sovereign immunity case, The "Gul Djemal", 69 for the proposition
that not every representative or official of a government is capable of invoking
the sovereign rights and immunities of the government. 70 Hence, the court of
appeals decision was 7reversed
and the affirmative judgment of the district
1
court was reinstated.
Justice White and three other Justices further suggested that "the concept of
an act of state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely
commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities. '72 The opinion drew attention to the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity, adopted by the State Department in 1952, which
recognizes the immunity of a sovereign only for its public or governmental
acts, and not for private acts. 73 Several earlier decisions of the Court were
64. Id.
65. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 422 U.S. 1005 (1975). It may seem
somewhat odd that the Court directed reargument on the international law exception. The facts
of Dunhill do not represent any international law question since the Cuban expropriation was the
property of Cuban citizens. See note 54 supra. An attorne) associated with the Dunhill litigation
has suggested to the author that the Court, evenly divided on the merits of the commercial act
exception to the act of state doctrine, ordered reargument in order to temporize until Justice
Douglas rejoined the court and could resolve the tie. Dunhill was originally argued on December
10, 1974, and Justice Douglas suffered a stroke on December 31, 1974. Although he rejoined the
Court briefly in March, Justice Douglas required continued hospitalization and was absent from
the Court from late April until late September of 1975. Reargument was ordered on June 16,
1975. 422 U.S. at 1005. Justice Douglas retired from the bench on November 12, 1975. 423 U.S.,
Preliminary Print, Part 1, at i (1975). Justice Stevens replaced him on December 19, 1975. 423
U.S., Preliminary Print, Part 2, at i (1975). Dunhill wa reargued on January 19, 1976, and
decided on May 24, 1976. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
66. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
67. Id. at 684-95.
68. Id. at 690-95.
69. 264 U.S. 90 (1924).
70. 425 U.S. at 693-94.
71. Id. at 684-95.
72. Id. at 695.
73. Id. at 698-702. This principle is now embodied in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891-92 (1976) 'codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330 &
1602-1611 (West Supp. 1977)).
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cited which had recognized the proposition that a government is subject to

74
ordinary commercial law when engaged in commercial activity.
Three Justices joined with Justice Marshall in dissent, reaching opposite
conclusions on both points.7 - In their view, no particular form was necessary
for conduct to constitute an act of state, and the will and sovereign power of
the Cuban government had been clearly expressed in the case at bar.7 6 Since
judicial review of the commercial acts of a foreign state might well affront
that state and thereby interfere with the conduct of foreign relations, the
dissenting Justices felt that the act of state
doctrine should compel the
77
dismissal of the counterclaim against Cuba.
In sum, the four exceptions proposed to the basic act of state doctrine have
not brought coherent development to the doctrine, but rather have blurred its
outline. The Bernstein exception has been considered and adopted by only the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.78 When the issue reached the Supreme

Court in First National City Bank, a plurality of three Justices thought the
courts should follow the expressed opinion of the executive, 79 but the two
concurring Justices and the four dissenters explicitly rejected the exception."
The international law exception was rejected by eight Justices in Sabbatino
despite its acceptance by both lower federal courts. 8 ' That decision, however,
provoked Congress into mandating an international law exception in some
expropriation cases . 2 Moreover, in 1975, the Court itself indicated some
uncertainty about its prior rejection of the international law exception by
ordering argument on whether Sabbatino should be reconsidered. 8 3 The
counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine has been poorly articulated.
The Supreme Court has never decided a case on the basis of the exception,
and only Justice Douglas, in First National City Bank, has considered it to be
controlling in an act of state context. 8 4 However, the plurality opinion in First
National City Bank rested indirectly on the counterclaim exception, since it
relied on a State Department letter which utilized a counterclaim rationale for
not applying the act of state doctrine. 85 Thus, the counterclaim exception is
74. 425 U.S. at 695-97 (citing New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946)); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); Bank
of United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. 398, 399, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (1824).
75. 425 U.S. at 715-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 715-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 715-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

78. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
79. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972).
80. Id. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 776-78 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
81. See notes 20-32 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
84.

406 U.S. at 759, 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).

85. The text of the State Department letter is reproduced as an appendix to the court of
appeals opinion on remand in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 442 F.2d 530,
536-38 app. (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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the holding which courts have synthesized from the diverse opinions in First
National City Bank.8 6 The status of the commercial act exception is also
uncertain. It was accepted by four Justices in Dunhill, but rejected by four
others. Justice Stevens declined to express an opinion on the exception and if
the other Justices adhere8 7to their opinions, he will decide the question when
he speaks on the issue.
III.

THE FUNDAMENTAL ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

Before conducting an in-depth analysis and evaluation of the four exceptions to the act of state doctrine, it is helpful to examine the historical context
within which the doctrine developed. The act of state doctrine originated in
the conception of sovereignty held by early jurists.8 The sovereign state was
considered the source of all authority, and thus created law by its acts. 9
Because each state possessed exclusive jurisdiction over events taking place
within its own territory, 90 no other state could predicate judicial action on
such events, and the sole intercourse between sovereigns was through diplomatic rather than judicial channels. 9 1 But these conceptions have not
withstood the passage of time, and both the domestic and international
immunity of sovereign states have been restricted by judicial, legislative, and
executive acts. 92 Consequently, the act of state doctrine today rests on
different grounds than it did when early American courts considered the
subject.
Cases prior to World War II discussed the act of state doctrine largely in
terms of considerations of sovereign immunity. 93 However, modern judicial
analysis found that the doctrine stems from the constitutional separation of
powers, and reflects a fear that judicial pronouncements inconsistent with the
views of the executive may embarrass the conduct of American foreign
relations or affront a foreign government. 94 "[T]he act of state doctrine['s]...
continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on
matters bearing upon foreign affairs."9 5
86. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1373-74 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub non. Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S 682 (1976).
87. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 715 (1976).
88. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 74, 85, 7 Cranch 116, 136(1812) (Marshall, J.).
89. See id.; J. Brierly, The Law of Nations 7-16 (5th ed. 1955); 1 L. Oppenheim,
International Law 103-07 (1905).
90. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909); Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
91. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
92. See National City Bank v. Republic of China, .148 U.S. 356, 358-61 (1955).
93. E.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
94. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
95. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
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Despite the attractive logic of the separation of powers rationale, however,
there is no indication of any embarrassment to the executive branch when act
of state cases are decided on their merits. In two recent cases, Sabbatino on
remand and First National City Bank, the State Department informed the
courts that application of the act of state doctrine was not required by
American foreign policy interests. 96 Moreover, in the only example of direct
conflict, when the government of Britain refused to recognize the Franco
government in Spain in 1939, the House of Lords did so in effect by a decision
without apparent difficulties for the executive.9
In the particular context of adjudications under international law, there is
still less likelihood of interference with the conduct of foreign relations since
international law is a more neutral and appropriate ground for invalidating an
act of state than the law or policy of the forum. 98 Many foreign nations
examine acts of state under international law without apparent conflict with
the conduct of foreign affairs. 99 In fact, the State Department has informed
the Supreme Court that "[i]n general this Department's experience provides
little support for a presumption that adjudication of acts of foreign states in
accordance with relevant principles of international law would embarrass the
conduct of foreign policy."10 0 Further, in refusing extraterritorial effect to a
foreign expropriation, enforcing judgments of foreign courts, and denying the
validity of acts committed by belligerents in occupied territory, courts have
long reviewed the validity of governmental acts' 01 with little apparent concern for possible affront to the acting state or detriment to foreign relations.
Moreover, there is an obvious competing interest to be weighed against any
possible embarrassment to the executive or impairment of foreign relations,
i.e., the duty of the courts to render justice to parties who seek to settle
disputes through adjudication. In his dissent in Sabbatino, Mr. Justice White
took issue with the majority's "disregard. . . of the rights of litigants to a full
determination on the merits"' 0 2 and stated "that our courts are obliged to
determine
controversies on their merits, in accordance with the applicable
0 3
law."

96. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 707-0 app. 1 (1976).
97. Zander, supra note 8, at 436 n.123.
98. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabattino, 307 F.2d 845, 859 (2d Cir. 1962), ret'd, 376 U.S.
398 (1964).
99. Among the nations doing so are England, the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, France, and
Austria. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 709-10 & an.2 & 3
app. 1; Banco Naional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 440 n.1 (1964).
100. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 710.
101. In the past, American courts have reviewed the validity of the effects of acts of state
outside the territory of the acting state as well as the effect of foreign judgments. Remarks by
John R. Stevenson, Seventh Hammarskjold Forum, Jan. 11, 1965, in The Aftermath of
Sabbatino 76 (L. Tondel, Jr. ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson Remarks]. Where a
belligerent occupier of a third state exercises power in fact in the occupied land, its acts are
reviewable under international law. Zander, supra note 8, at 429.
102. 376 U.S. at 441 (White, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 450-51 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White pointed to language in article III of
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In addition to the separation of powers arguments, the Supreme Court has
adduced two additional grounds in support of the act of state doctrine. First,
the Court has questioned the "presupposition that the decisions of the courts
of the world's major capital exporting country and principal exponent of the
free enterprise system would be accepted as disinterested expressions of sound
legal principle by those adhering to widely different ideologies."' 0 4 One
solution to this dilemma would be for the State Department to agree to allow
appeal of any claimed denial of justice to an international tribunal. 105 Such an
approach would also make domestic review of foreign acts of state an
important source for the development of international law. 10 6 Secondly, the
Supreme Court has suggested that review of foreign acts of state would make
title to goods flowing in international trade uncertain within the United
States, and thus alter the flow of trade between nations.' 0 7 The validity of
such a suggestion may be questioned, however, since it is not the possibility of
judicial review that makes title uncertain, but rather the invalid taking itself,
inasmuch as it undermines the fundamental stability provided by basic
property and contract law.10
Thus, the historical and legal bases for the act of state doctrine have been
challenged and debated with the passage of time. Perhaps as a result, the four
exceptions to the act of state doctrine are not as yet solidly based and have
similarly been the subject of confused and uncertain treatment. The remainder of this Comment will analyze the exceptions within their legal and
empirical context, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each, and identify
those exceptions which rest on sound judicial reasoning while complementing
the theory behind the act of state doctrine,
IV.

THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW EXCEPTION TO THE

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

The proposed international law exception to the act of state doctrine was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino because it feared that "piecemeal
dispositions"' 0 9 by the courts under international law would seriously interthe Constitution and in the Judicial Code as evidence of this duty. Id. at 451-52. As one
commentator has written, "the claim of potential political .-mbarrassment, an abstraction at best,
should be looked at critically when its price is the deprivation of an individual's ability to claim a
legal remedy." Kincaid, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign State-Owned Corporations, 10 J. World
Trade L. 112 (1976). Although these words come from a sovereign immunity context, their
relevance is evident. For further discussion of the relationship between sovereign immunity and
act of state concepts, see notes 185-200 infra and accompanying text.
104. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 434-35 (1964). The court of
appeals in Sabbatino had discussed the assertion that American courts were too provincial to
provide a proper forum for examining the validity of foreign acts of state. 307 F.2d at 857.
105. Stevenson Remarks, supra note 101, at 75.
106. Id.; see notes 132-39 infra and accompanying text.
107. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U S. at 433-34.
108. Id. at 459. See also Stevenson Remarks, supra note 101, at 76-77.
109. 376 U.S. at 431-32.
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fere with the conduct of diplomatic negotiations in that they "might prevent
or render less favorable the terms of an agreement that could otherwise be
reached."" 0 The Court regarded such negotiations as a more effective means
than litigation for securing compensation for American claimants."'
At least two recommendations, however, have disagreed with this appraisal. John R. Stevenson, former Chairman of the New York State Bar
Association's Committee on International Law, 112 has criticized the Court's
reasoning and pointed to the long delays and poor recoveries which frequently
attend diplomatic settlements. 1 3 Similarly, Professor Richard B. Lillich, after
six years of work on the law of international claims,' 4 has referred to the
"[State Department's] shopworn argument about the efficacy of diplomatic
remedies." ' "1 5 Detailed examination of recent diplomatic settlements for expropriated American property" 6 does much to belie the superior efficacy of
diplomatic channels. In most cases, the agreements were not reached until
many years after the claims arose," 17 and the delay coupled with the reduced
amounts recovered in settlement, resulted in very low percentage rates of
effective recovery." 8 Further, the agreements often excluded many claimants
altogether, and were inferior to those concluded by the expropriating state
19
with other claimant nations.
Acceptance of poor recoveries and public admissions that low level goals
are pursued 1 20 may prevent the United States from insisting upon higher
compensation in the future. 2 1 Further, such precedents could prove to be
particularly dangerous at a time when expropriations of American property
throughout the world occur with increasing frequency. 2 2 However, this
11O. Id.
111. Id.
112. See The Aftermath of Sabbatino x (L. Tondel, Jr. ed. 1965).
113. Stevenson Remarks, supra note 101, at 75.
114. R. Lillich, The Protection of Foreign Investment vii (1965) [hereinafter cited as Protection].
115. Id. at 103.
116. See Agreement with Hungary, March 6, 1973, [1973] 24 U.S.T. 522, T.I.A.S. No. 7569.
For a proposed agreement with Czechoslovakia, see Lillich, The GravelAmendment to the Trade
Reform Act of 1974; Congress Checkmates a PresidentialLump Sum Agreement, 69 Am. J. Intl L.
837 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Czechoslovakia].
117. Lillich, The United States-HungarianClaims Agreement of 1973, 69 Am. J. Intl L. 534
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hungary]; Czechoslovakia, supra note 116.
118. Hungary, supra note 117, at 555-56 & n.165 (four and one-half per cent); Czechoslovakia,
supra note 116, at 839-41 & n.23 (when calculated on the same basis, perhaps lower than
Hungary).
119. See Hungary, supra note 117, at 552-55.
120. A. Rovine, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1974, at 427 (1975).
121. Hungary, supra note 117, at 557-58. Indeed, Czechoslovakia has asserted that she
should pay no greater percentage compensation than did Hungary. Id. at 558.
122. Senate Comm. on Finance, Trade Reform Act of 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 217 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7186, 7348. The State
Department has defended these settlements by misrepresenting their favorable nature. See
Hungary, supra note 117, at 554-55; Czechoslovakia, supra note 116, at 840 n.23.
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system of recovery ultimately fails in that no body of law is built by the
process. While the history of prior negotiations may significantly affect future
results, 123 it contributes little or nothing to an understanding of the legal
rights of parties affected by the acts of foreign states.1 24 It is unlikely that the
rights of a private person to property and freedom of activity, or those of a
state to take action in order to solve public problems, can be determined by
proceedings in1 25which shrewd bargaining is more effective than compliance
with the law.
In rejecting the proposed international law exception to the act of state
doctrine, the Supreme Court also placed great weight on the unsettled nature
of international law, particularly with respect to the expropriation of the
property of aliens. 126 The Court reasoned that the function of the judiciary is
to apply principles of law to the facts of particular controversies, not to create
or discover previously unknown principles which would govern foreign acts of
state. 127 The point is sound, but the Court gave only a cursory survey of the
law in the area before stating that no consensus on governing principles
exists.' 28 Commenting on this, Judge Philip C. Jessup of the International
Court of Justice noted that in forty-five years neither the Permanent Court of
International Justice nor its successor, the International Court of Justice, had
ever declined to decide a case because it could not identify an applicable rule
of international law. 129 Moreover, the Supreme Court may have subtly
misconceived the nature of customary international law by comparing it to the
more settled nature of municipal law. Disagreement between nations with
respect to the international law of expropriations should not be given undue
weight.
[U]nilateral assertions about international law . . . if accepted and acted upon by a
considerable number of other states, can create the expectations we call customary
international law. Unanimity has never been a requirement for such law. The very
purpose of customary law, in contrast with agreement, is to bind states who have not
explicitly accepted-to give states a way30of binding themselves without appearing to
impair inflated notions of sovereignty.1
123. See notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
124. Indeed, negotiators may have little sense that their claimants' right to compensation
arises from a legal relationship between the parties. Czechoslovakia, supra note 116, at 846.
125. See notes 141-48 infra and accompanying text.
126. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-30 (1964).
127. Id. at 428.
128. Id. at 428-30. See Justice White's criticism of the Court's treatment of this area. Id. at
455 (White, J., dissenting).
129. Remarks of Judge Philip C. Jessup, Seventh Hammarskjold Forum, Jan. 11, 1965, in
The Aftermath of Sabbatino 102 (L. Tondel, Jr. ed. 1965). Judge Jessup suggested that it would
be possible, through an amendment to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, for
national courts to inquire of the court about a rule of international law which was at issue. Such a
determination by the International Court of Justice might be controlling or merely advisory. Id.
at 102-03.
130. Remarks of Professor Myres S. McDougal, Seventh Hammarskjold Forum, Jan. 11,
1965, in The Aftermath of Sabbatino 99 (L. Tondel, Jr. ed. 1965).
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The Supreme Court's concern over the unsettled nature of international law
on the expropriation of the property of aliens lead them to ignore substantial
evidence of settled customary international law on the question. There exist,
for example, numerous agreements among capital importing and exporting
3
nations with respect to the confiscation of the private property of aliens.' '
The Court was aware, too, of a United Nations General Assembly resolution
which accepted an international law standard of compensation for all expropriations. 132 While such resolutions are not binding, one adopted by an
overwhelming margin of both developing and industrialized states would
certainly be indicative of customary international law. 33 Finally, it may be
noted that Congress has directed the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
in adjudicating the entitlement of American claimants to the proceeds of
settlements negotiated by the State Department, to apply, in order, "provisions of the applicable claims agreement.., 34and ... the applicable principles
of international law, justice, and equity."'
In refusing to recognize an international law exception to the act of state
doctrine, the Supreme Court further ignored the basic proposition that
law of which American
international law is an integral part of American
35
courts may not decline to remedy violations.'
Indeed, in an earlier decision, Hilton v. Guyot, 136 which concerned the
effect of a foreign judgment in American courts, the Supreme Court stated:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including . . . the
131.

Professor Robert Y. Jennings has collected fifty treaties conduded among thirty-two

developing countries and various industrialized nations as of January 6, 1965, which provide for
compensation according to international law for any confiscation of the private property of aliens.
Remarks of Professor Robert Y. Jennings, Seventh Hammarskjold Forum, Jan. 11, 1965, in The

Aftermath of Sabbatino 93-94, 96-97 (L. Tondel, Jr. ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Jennings
Remarks].
132. The resolution states in pertinent part: "4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which
are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In

such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in
force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with
international law." G. A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at IS, U.N. Doc. A15217 (1962),
reprinted in 2 International .Legal Materials 223, 225 (1963).
133. Protection, supra note 114, at 83; Seidl-Hohenvelder, Chilean Copper Nationalization
Cases before German Courts, 69 Am. J. Int'l L. 110, 111 (1975); Stevenson Remarks, supra note
101, at 78.
134. 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1970).
135. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 450-51 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97
(1907); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); District of Columbia v. International
Distrib. Corp., 331 F.2d 817, 820 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp.
67, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This doctrine developed in England and was thus introduced into the
thirteen colonies. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 451-52 (AVhlite, J.,
dissenting). Thomas Jefferson had said: "The law of nations makes an integral part... of the
laws of the land." Quoted in 1 J. Moore, A Digest of International L.aw § 2, at 10 (1906).
136. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts,
private or public, done within the dominions of another nation-is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such
questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their
determination.
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions is a treaty or
statute of this country. But when, as is the case here, there is no written law upon the
subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring
what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to do so,137in order to determine the
rights of parties to suits regularly brought before them.

A similar Passage is found in The Paquete Habana,138 where it was decided
that an act of the United States violated 13international law and therefore
would not be upheld by American courts. 5
When domestic acts of state are involved, s in The Paquete Habana, the
possibility of affront to a foreign government does not exist to mandate
judicial abstention. However, the fact that the United States government is
subject to international law in American courts suggests that American courts
have a reciprocal duty to review foreign acts of state under international law.
The Paquete Habana decision additionally implies a limit to the judiciary's
fear of hampering the executive branch in its conduct of foreign affairs. While
the judiciary must cooperate with the executive branch, which has primary
responsibility in this area, that cooperation should extend only to what is
possible under the law; it cannot be an excuse for failing to do justice in cases
which come before the courts. 140
A compelling argument in favor of an international law exception is that
resultant court decisions would contribute significantly to the development of
international law. Since international judicial bodies have few cases before
them due to the absence of compulsory jurisdiction, application of international law by domestic courts may make substantial contributions to the
accretion of case law.141 Indeed, domestic courts are particularly well suited
to the development of case law on acts of state. This is so because the
International Court of Justice at present may act only when states are the
parties to the controversy,' 42 and when the nations concerned have voluntarily submitted themselves to its jurisdiction. 143 Although the immunity of the
137.

Id. at 163.

138.

175 U.S.

677, 700 (1900).

139. The case involved two Cuban fishing vessels captured as prizes of war by United States
Navy warships. Identifying a rule of customary international law that coastal fishing vessels,
peaceably engaged in their pursuit, were not subject to capture as prizes during the time of war,
the Supreme Court ordered that the United States pay the claimant all proceeds of the sale of the
vessels and cargo, as well as damages and costs. Id. at 686-714.
140. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-07 (1974); cf. United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972) (executive branch may not order wiretaps without
judicial warrant, even on domestic security grounds).
141.

First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972) (Powell, J.,

concurring); Jennings Remarks, supra note 131, at 91; Stevenson Remarks, supra note 101, at
74-75. Contra, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 434-35 (1964).
142.

I.C.J. Stat. art. 34, para. 1.

143.

I.C.J. Stat. art. 36, para. 1, 2. While the International Court may also give advisory
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sovereign state would prevent act of state cases from being brought in
domestic courts against a foreign nation as defendant, suits between the
expropriated party and a third party purchaser from the expropriating state
could only be brought in such courts.'" Sovereign immunity does not enter
the case, and the domestic court will acquire jurisdiction by ordinary processes.
It must be acknowledged that an international law exception to the act of
state doctrine poses several potential problems. 145 As already noted, international law may be too uncertain for domestic courts to apply 146 and the
47
resultant opinions may not be accepted as sound law in other nations.
However, these objections are basically inconsistent with the common law
tradition. 148 The fact that fifty states may pronounce different opinions on a
question common to all of them has never prevented the highest court of a
state from ruling on a particular issue. The accumulation of persuasive
authority is obviously as important as that of mandatory authority to a
decision-making system built upon case law and precedent.
There is, however, a more fundamental objection to an international law
exception to the act of state doctrine. It is one of a jurisprudential nature,
based upon the shape of the present world system. Since World War II, the
appearance of many newly independent states has profoundly affected international relations and international law.1 49 As a group, these new states have
views on many areas of international law significantly different from those of
the more developed states. 5M This stems from a belief on the part of the new
states that much international law was created without their participation and
solely to protect the interests of developed states. '5 1 Because the international
legal system has no supreme authority and depends upon consensus among
member states in order to establish its rules, it has been suggested that the
system must reflect the wide dispersion of sovereign state authority, as well as
opinions to United Nations organs in accordance with U.N. Charter art. 96, that power is not
relevant to the discussion here.
144. Only states may be parties to cases before the International Court of Justice. See note
142 supra; see, e.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frires Soci&6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d
246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
145. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-37 (1964).
146. See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text.
148. Jennings Remarks, supra note 131, at 89.
149c. See Castaneda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International Law,
15 Int'l Org. 38 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Castaneda].
150. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429-30; Castaneda, supra note 149, at
39-40.
151. Castaneda, supra note 149, at 38-40. International law, which is several centuries old,
necessarily reflects the views and attitudes of the Western European nations, which were the
nation states that shaped its development. Id. at 39. It may be suggested that such law is unfairly
slanted toward the position of expansive, industrialized states. Whether this argument is accurate
may be less important than the perception of new states that international law somehow subverts
their efforts to achieve equality of international position.
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the diverse social and political values of member states. 152 Professor Richard
Falk has supported rules of judicial deference, such as the act of state
doctrine, as a result of his careful jurisprudential analysis of the consensual
roots of international law.1- 3 Falk has proposed a view of international law
based upon a horizontal order, where power is distributed among many equal
5 4
centers, none of which may impose its legal authority on any of the others.'
In such a setting, Falk has suggested that domestic courts must defer to the
acts of other sovereigns, since the judgments of a domestic court on the acts of
a foreign state cannot expound an effective rule of international law, i.e., one
which will be accepted and applied by other equal centers of power and
authority.' 55 Such deference and mutual respect support the development of
international law by creating an atmosphere in which consensus and additions
to international law by agreement among states become possible. However, in
accepting or rejecting Falk's model, a state should consider whether it will
defer to contrary views, or strongly refute them, in order to best secure
acceptance of its view of proper international law on a particular question.
Professor Falk has noted that domestic courts do not have formal international authority from either a constitutive document or a supranational
institution. 56 Nor do they command the coercive power necessary to give
their pronouncements on foreign acts of state the full force of law in other
nations.' 5 7 While this does not mean that such courts are without authority to
rule on the validity of a foreign act of state,' 5 s Professor Falk argues that they
should refuse to do so because their decision will carry no authority in the
courts of other nations and thus cannot be effective. 159
In response, it may be suggested that a court should nevertheless decide the
controversy before it, and allow foreign courts to determine the weight of the
decision. While the parochial or ill-considered holding will doubtless command little respect, the well-reasoned and disinterested decision may prove
persuasive, if not compelling, in foreign courts. Further, there is another
manner in which a domestic court's decision may ultimately affect the body of
international law. While international law seeks to enforce its standards upon
state behavior, it also strives to conform its prescriptions to a form where
lawful behavior will be synonymous with ideal behavior. 160 If American
courts renounce their function as interpreters of international law simply
because they may be unable to enforce their judgments, they lose the
opportunity to make international law more comprehensive and closer to an
ideal of just behavior between nations.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161 (L.

R. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order 5-10 (1964).
Id. at 9-12.
Id. at 21-27, 39-50.
Id. at 9-12.
Id. at 17-20.
Id. at 21-27.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U S. 398, 421-23 (1964).
See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
Stone, What Price Effectiveness?, in International Law in the Twentieth Century 160,
Gross ed. 1969).
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V.

THE Bernstein EXCEPTION TO THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

The Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine was first considered by
the Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 161 where it was adopted by a plurality.' 62 Those Justices found that the
basis of the act of state doctrine rested in judicial recognition of "the primacy
of the Executive in the conduct of foreign relations" as well as in judicial
reluctance to pronounce opinions which "could embarrass the conduct of
foreign relations by the political branches of the government." 63 Further, the
plurality asserted that the exception was "in no sense an abdication of the
judicial function to the Executive Branch."' 164 The judiciary had created the
65
doctrine to meet its own concerns about conflict with the executive.'
Therefore, when the executive dispelled those concerns by a communication
66
to the court, the judiciary simply had no need to apply the doctrine.'
In First National City Bank, six Justices rejected the Bernstein exception. 167 They reasoned that the executive would encourage the judiciary to
reach a judgment on the merits when it was indifferent to the outcome of a
case or suspected that the court would reach the "right" result for American
foreign policy interests. 168 Under this analysis, if the State Department fears a
"wrong" result it will leave the act of state doctrine undisturbed and the court
will not reach the merits of the case at issue. Adoption of an exception which
encourages such guessing and manipulation by the executive branch is of
dubious wisdom. 169 Moreover, the four dissenters in First National City Bank
asserted that the act of state doctrine is grounded on more than a concern that
the executive not be embarrassed in the conduct of foreign affairs.' 70 Even if
a Bernstein letter is issued indicating that the executive can foresee no

difficulty if judgment is reached on the merits, such a determination will not
dispel judicial concern for
the absence of consensus on the applicable international rules, the unavailability of
standards from a treaty or other agreement, the existence and recognition of the
[government in question], the sensitivity of the issues to national concerns, and the
power of the Executive alone to effect a fair remedy for all United States citizens who
have been harmed ....
171
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

406
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. 759 (1972).
at 759-70.
at 765-67.
at 768.

167. The four dissenting Justices rejected the exception. Justices Douglas and Powell also
rejected the exception, while concurring in the result reached by the plurality.
168. First Natl City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring); id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 782-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 782-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 785-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 788 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Whatever doubts exist regarding the relative importance of these factors, 172
it seems clear that the judiciary must in each case weigh the relevant factors
and determine whether or not to apply the doctrine. 173 "[A] doctrine which
would require the judiciary to receive the Executive's permission before
invoking its jurisdiction . . . in the name of the doctrine of separation of
74
powers, seems . . . to conflict with that very doctrine.'
Those who reject the Bernstein exception have the better position. While
the executive may advise a court not to worry, the judiciary should satisfy
itself independently that judgment upon the merits will not raise the evils
sought to be avoided by the act of state doctrine.
VI.

THE COUNTERCLAIM EXCEPTION TO THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

This exception to the doctrine arises from the Supreme Court's decision in
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba. '75 As a result of the
varying analyses of the case by the courts which have construed it, the
counterclaim exception is not as well defined as the other exceptions to the act
of state doctrine.' 7 6 It was first articulated in a letter from the State Department to the Supreme Court, stating the department's views on the pending
case. The letter advised the Court of the
determination by the Department of State that the act of state doctrine need not be
applied when it is raised to bar adjudication of a counterclaim or setoff when (a) the
foreign state's claim arises from a relationship between the parties existing when the
act of state occurred; (b) the amount of the relief to be granted is limited to the amount
of the foreign state's claim; and (c) the foreign
policy interests of the United States do
177
not require application of the doctrine.
The plurality in First National City Bank reached its result by accepting
this letter as activating the Bernstein exception. ' 7 8 However, Justice Douglas,
concurring in the result, felt that the counterclaim exception dictated the
result in the case. 179 To support this view, Justice Douglas drew upon the
Court's treatment of the law of sovereign immunity in National City Bank v.
Republic of China.810 In that case, National City Bank had responded to
China's suit for the recovery of deposited funds by claiming as a setoff the
money due on some Treasury notes on which China had defaulted. The Court
held that "the ultimate thrust of the consideration of fair dealing which allows
172. See notes 96-148 supra and accompanying text.
173. 406 U.S. at 790-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 759.
176. See notes 33-50 supra and accompanying text.
177. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 537 (2d Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
178. See notes 161-66 supra and accompanying text.
179. 406 U.S. at 770-72 (Douglas, J., concurring).
180. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
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a setoff or counterclaim"' 8 ' served to overcome the sovereign immunity of a
state plaintiff.18 2 The Court felt that when a foreign state tries to use
American courts to enforce its rights, fairness requires that all the rights of the
parties be judicially determined. 8 3 Applying the same reasoning in First
National City Bank, Justice Douglas favored a setoff to the extent of Cuba's
claim "because Cuba [was] the one who ask[ed] our judicial aid in collecting
its debt from petitioner and, as the Republic of China case says, 'fair dealing'
requires recognition of any counterclaim or setoff that eliminates or reduces
18 4
that claim.'
Although he concurred in the result, Justice Powell, along with the four
dissenters, rejected the counterclaim exception.' 85 Both Justice Powell and
the dissenters pointed to the different nature of the doctrines of sovereign
immunity and act of state.' 8 6 Justice Powell observed that sovereign immunity was a bar to a court's jurisdiction over a party, while the act of state
doctrine focused on particular issues and defined them as non-justiciable,
whether or not a sovereign nation happened to be the defendant. 8 7 The
dissenters emphasized the different role of the executive vis-.-vis the two
doctrines.' 88 Even where sovereign immunity does not bar an action, the
executive branch must retain the authority to deal with act of state matters
because these questions are poorly suited to judicial determination. 8 9 It is not
all that clear, however, that comparisons between sovereign immunity cases
and those dealing with acts of state are inappropriate. Actually, the opinion of
Chief Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,190 a sovereign
immunity case, suggests that both doctrines stem from the same considerations, namely, "that the sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to
avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which such
wrongs give birth, are rather questions of policy than of law, that they are for
diplomatic, rather than legal discussion ... ."191 Furthermore, Justice Brennan's
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 365.
Id. at 364-66.
Id. at 361-62.

184. 406 U.S. at 772 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
185. Id. at 773-74 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 793-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 773-74 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 793 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 773-74 (Powell, J., concurring). While this argument is analytically correct, it is
overcome by the recognition that both doctrines are similar in practical effect. They sacrifice the
right of a private party to a judgment on the merits. The deficiencies of the doctrines are
illustrated not by legal analysis but by a certainty that too many rights are being sacrificed to
sovereign status and the doctrines must therefore be contracted.
188. Id. at 793-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. 11 U.S. 74, 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
191. Id. at 91-92, 7 Cranch at 146. Compare this language to the statement of the act of state
doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See note 2 supra and accompanying text. It may also be noted that Underhill presented facts that could have been decided on
settled principles of the sovereign immunity of public officials for acts in the pursuance of their
official duties. Instead, the Supreme Court chose to open its opinion with the broad statement
which has come to be recognized as the act of state doctrine. Zander, supra note 8, at 415.
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dissent in First National City Bank, £92 arguing for the difference between the
act of state and sovereign immunity doctrines may have been based on an
inappropriate analysis. The list of concerns arguing for application of the act
of state doctrine which are purportedly not involved in the doctrine of
sovereign immunity 93 is clearly derived from the Supreme Court's consideration of Sabbatino.194 However, the issue in that case was whether or not
there should be an international law exception to the act of state doctrine, 195
and the listed factors are those which the Supreme Court considered to
militate against that particular exception.' 96 They do not apply to the basic
act of state doctrine, the foundations of which rest upon principles of
deference among nations and particularly among branches of the American
government. 97 Thus the two doctrines do have common historical and
analytical roots and Justice Douglas' use of a case from one doctrine to shape
the other is justified. 198 The same considerations which demand an exception
to the sovereign immunity doctrine weigh in favor of a similar exception in
cases dealing with acts of state. Refusal to recognize a counterclaim exception
to the right of sovereign immunity would permit a foreign state to avail itself
of American law and yet evade just claims against it by the defendant.' 99
Unless a counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine is adopted, a
foreign state may similarly 200
use American courts to collect its debts, while
avoiding its own liabilities.
A further development in the counterclaim exception arose in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. 20 1 In that case, the Supreme
Court directed the parties to brief and argue the question: "[1]s an exception to
the act of state doctrine created, under [First National City Bank], where
petitioner's counterclaim does not exceed the net balance owed to Cuba on its
claims by petitioner's codefendants, and where all claims and counterclaims
arise out of the subject matter in litigation in this case?"202 This factual
setting will henceforth be termed a circumstantial counterclaim. The majority
did not reach this issue because it found that no act of state had taken
place. 20 3 However, the dissenting Justices reached the opposite conclusion
and went on to consider the circumstantial counterclaim. 20 4 The dissent
asserted that allowance of a counterclaim in excess of the foreign state's claim
192.
193.

406 U.S. at 785-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See note 171 supra and accompanying text.

194.

See 376 U.S. at 428-36.

195. See notes 19-30 supra and accompanying text
196. See 376 U.S. at 428-36.
197. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 427-28 (1964).
198. See notes 179-84 supra and accompanying text.
199. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1955).
200. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 772 (1971) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
201.

425 U.S. 682 (1976).

202.

Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974).

203.

425 U.S. at 684-95.

204.

425 U.S. at 730-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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raised the same sharp issues of affront to a coequal sovereign and denial of
international comity that would be raised by a naked suit against a foreign
government, 20 5 and should therefore be denied. The characterization of the
counterclaim as excessive was not altered by the presence of codefendants
who would ultimately pay the plaintiff state more than it was obliged to pay
the defendant which won its individual excessive counterclaim. 206 The dissent
pointed out that consolidation for trial is ordered for convenience and
efficiency, and does not alter the legal rights of the parties involved.20 7 While
there is no reasoning by the majority in support of the circumstantial
counterclaim raised by the facts in Dunhill, since the counterclaim was
approved on a narrower ground,2 0 8 the arguments in support of this circumstantial counterclaim exception are essentially the same as those advanced
in FirstNational City Bank . 2 09 All of these focus on the loss of special status
by a sovereign who acts affirmatively in bringing about litigation. In this
situation fairness requires that the courts do justice with respect to all the
issues in dispute between the parties, and not just those selected by the
plaintiff. It is not simplistic to observe that in an act of state situation, the
foreign state is always an assertive actor. The sovereign has taken the action
which is at issue. Further, it is within the power of the foreign state to
determine the number of defendants, 2 10 and so limit its possible liability. The
fundamental policy behind the counterclaim exception is that such an assertive actor, who practically controls the facts of a controversy, should not be
enabled by the act of state doctrine to control the execution of justice by
American courts. 21 1 The history of the counterclaim exception has been one of
the extension of this idea to more complex factual settings, and the essential
justice of the principle should rule whenever the facts present a counterclaim
against a sovereign plaintiff.
VII.

THE COMMERCIAL ACT ExCEPTION TO THE

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The exception of commercial and proprietary acts from the rights and
privileges of sovereignty has gained much support in the past. Chief Justice
Marshall early recognized the distinction between commercial and governmental acts in the very case which was the source of the sovereign
3
21 2
doctrine in the United States. 2 1
immunity (and perhaps the act of state)
205. Id. at 733-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 734-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 735 & nn.22 & 23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
209. See notes 175-84 supra and accompanying text.
210. For example, the presence of several defendants in Dunhil is not fortuitous because
Cuba could have expropriated fewer cigar manufacturers or returned the money mistakenly
received to some of the importers.
211. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 770-72 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Natfonal City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1955).
212. See notes 190-91 supra and accompanying text.
213. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 74, 91, 7 Cranch 116, 14S (1812).
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This distinction was given fuller expression a few years later in terms which
are relevant to the facts in Dunhill: "It is . . a sound principle, that when a
government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far
as concerns the transactions of that
company, of its sovereign character, and
214
takes that of a private citizen."
This distinction has since been recognized by the Supreme Court in a
variety of contexts.2 1 5 Furthermore, in Dunhill, the State Department recommended to the Court that it not consider defaults by a sovereign on its
commercial obligations to be acts of state beyond review in American
courts. 2 16 The State Department also indicated to the Court that it had
accepted, in 1952, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which denied
immunity to the sovereign's private or commercial acts. 2 17 The plurality
pointed out that the distinction between commercial and governmental acts
with respect to sovereign immunity has been adopted by many foreign
states.21 8 The plurality continued that the United States itself does not claim
such immunity with respect to its own merchant vessels, 21 9 and rapidly
increasing involvement of governments in commercial transactions created a
greater need for private persons dealing with them to secure adjudication of
disputes. 220 Finally, the plurality observed that many lower federal courts 22'
and the courts of many foreign states 222 have adopted the distinction between
commercial and governmental acts. While acknowledging that sovereign
immunity was not identical with the act of state doctrine, the four-Justice
plurality stated that all of these factors compelled the
recognition of a
223
commercial act exception to the act of state doctrine.
Thus, there is widespread acceptance of the refusal to grant foreign
sovereigns special consideration in their purely proprietary and commercial
activities. Moreover, the distinction is in harmony with the rationale of the
act of state doctrine. 224 The risk of affront to foreign governments and
consequent disruption of the executive's conduct of foreign affairs is greatly
214.
(1824).

215.

Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. 398, 399, 9 Wheat. 904, 907

Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-96 (1976).

216. Id. at 696-97.
217. Id. at 698. The State Department also supported legislation which enacted the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity as a statute several months after Dunhill. The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§
1330 & 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1977)). For a discussion of this legislation and its treatment of the
commercial-governmental act distinction, see Note, InternationalLaw-Act of State DoctrineForeign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
18 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 318 (1977).
218. See, e.g., Letter of the Acting Legal Adviser, 26 Dep't State Bull. 984-85 (1952),
reprinted in 425 U.S. at 711, 712-14 app.2.
219. 425 U.S. at 702, 714.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., cases collected in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 702-03 (1976).
222. Id. at 702 & n.15.
223. Id. at 705-06.
224. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
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diminished where only commercial interests are involved, rather than those
which are possessed only by governments.2 2 5 Even act of state cases in which
the facts did not present this distinction recognized that not every act of the
sovereign engages its authority in such fashion as to require treatment as an
act of state.2 2 6 Justice Powell in his concurrence in the adoption of the
commercial act exception reiterated his opinion that the courts should decide
act of state cases unless their independent examination made it appear that to
do so would interfere with the conduct of foreign relations.2 2-7 He indicated
that such cases were rare and that no such interference would result in
international law exception or commercial act circumstances. 2 28
The considerations raised in opposition to a commercial act exception to the
act of state doctrine do not seem persuasive. Chief among them is the
argument that sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine are distinct
legal entities whose features may not be freely interchanged.2 2 9 Besides the
230
arguments already marshalled against this position in the discussion above,
it must be pointed out that the act of state and sovereign immunity doctrines
are particularly interdependent with regard to commercial activities of
sovereigns. Where the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is accepted,
the sovereign will be subject to adjudication for any default on his commercial
obligations. But if the act of state doctrine does not also recognize a commercial act exception, the sovereign may repudiate these same commercial
through the act of state doctrine, an immunity
obligations and thereby regain,
31
previously denied by law.1
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has discussed both the judicial history and the analytical
bases of the act of state doctrine and the asserted exceptions to it. The hope
has been to reach conclusions on both the current and desirable state of the
law in this area. The viability of the Bernstein exception in federal law at
present is doubtful. While accepted by the plurality in First National City
Bank, the majority of the Justices rejected it.2 32 It is submitted that the
exception is not consistent with the nature of the act of state doctrine, which
involves a balancing of political considerations against the right of the parties
to a judgment on the merits. 233 The judiciary should determine whether a case
presents an exception to the general rule that courts judge the merits of cases
before them. To permit a political branch, without statutory or constitutional
sanction, to determine the outcome of a case violates judicial independence
225.

Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1976).

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 706.
Id. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
See notes 176-83 supra and accompanying text.
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Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 698-99,
See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 94, 102-03 supra and accompanying text.
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234

and the separation of powers.
Further, considerable uncertainty in litigation inevitably attends the Bernstein exception since it substitutes political
analysis for the relative stability and objectivity of judicial determination.
The international law exception has received little support in the Supreme
Court. Only Justices White and Powell have expressed support for adherence
to international law in act of state cases. 235 It is submitted that international
law should rule the facts of any act of state case to which it applies. The
notion that the actions of nations may be judged only from a political, rather
than legal, viewpoint is a primitive one. The developing position is that state
conduct, whether toward other states or private persons, is amenable to the
rule of international law as applied by judicial institutions. The United States
courts have long enforced international law as part of American law and
failure to do so in act of state cases is a regrettable anomaly. 236 Private
litigants should generally favor the international law exception since their
ability to dispute justice with sovereign states is greater than their ability to
dispute power.
The counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine has been judicially
accepted. 237 However, it is not as significant doctrinally as the international
law or commercial act exceptions, since it has a relatively narrow procedural
application and is not analytically complex. However, it recognizes the inherent unfairness in the position of a state which resorts to self-help and then
seeks an additional legal recovery while avoiding accountability for its prior
resort to power. In both First National City Bank, where the counterclaim
was limited to the extent of the sovereign's claim, 238 and in Dunhill, where
the circumstantial counterclaim was suggested by the grant of certiorari, 239
the state had control over the factual setting of the litigation. The pervasive
duplicity and legal fiction so involved in this kind of proceeding override the
considerations supporting the act of state doctrine and require recognition of
the counterclaim exception in both situations While the counterclaim exception cannot prevent a state from employing iti power against a private party,
it prevents a state from further infringing the rights of that party through the
procedural strategy of a pious lawsuit.
The commercial act exception is the most recent exception asserted to the
act of state doctrine. While four Justices accepted and four rejected the
exception, 240 the Second Circuit has read the Dunhill decision as announcing
a commercial act exception. 24' When the sovereign enters a course of dealing
as a commercial actor, its claim to sovereign prerogatives is considerably
234. See notes 168-69, 174 supra and accompanying text.
235. See notes 31-32, 45 supra and accompanying text.
236. See notes 135-40 supra and accompanying text.
237. See notes 175-211 supra and accompanying text.
238. See note 177 supra and accompanying text.
239. See note 202 supra and accompanying text.
240. See notes 72-75, 77 supra and accompanying text.
241. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3692 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1977) (No. 76-1403).

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

1977]

weakened. 24 2 Further, the executive branch of the United States government
is no better suited than the judiciary to resolve disputes arising from commer-

cial activity. 243 When sovereign stature is lessened, the right of the parties to

judgment on the merits becomes more compelling. This exception is probably
most important to private litigants, who are given some assurance that they
may enter commercial dealings with a foreign state in a position of legal
equality. Such commercial dealings are probably the most common source of
act of state litigation, and the area in which economic consequences will flow
most immediately from developments in the law.
There is an important core of reason within the act of state doctrine. The
doctrine recognizes that national governments, in their task of organizing and
advancing the interests of their populace, are impelled and restrained by
forces which set them apart from other suitors in federal courts. For this
reason, resolution of some disputes should perhaps be left to the political
branches of the American government, which are likewise subject to the same
forces. However, it is important to recognize the competing rights of private
parties to hold property and to just resolution of disputes. One-sided analysis
of the doctrine obstructs the development of international law and ignores the
long-term necessity for interaction between foreign states and private persons.
The pedantic approach of the Supreme Court in the early act of state cases,
present still in Sabbatino's consideration of the international law exception,
should be replaced by reasoning which empirically examines the factual
ramifications of the act of state doctrine. The need is for an approach which
gives broad attention to all the facts of a case, as has been advocated by
Justice Powell, 24 4 and which frankly recognizes and strikes a rational balance
between competing values. The international law exception and the commercial act exception serve to illustrate this broad approach. In each, timehonored legal doctrine is opposed by an empirical recognition of the effects of
the law upon the parties, and a fresh sense of fairness. It may be hoped that
both exceptions will soon be firmly recognized as limits upon the traditional
act of state doctrine.
Stephen G. Wolfe
242.
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